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O'Connor in 1989. He is presently doing a doctoral dissertation on Jacques
Maritain at the Accademia Alfonsia in Rome.
On January 13, 1993 the United States Supreme Court overturned a lower
court decision allowing the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, enacted to protect blacks
against conspiracies violating their civil rights, to be applied to the blockading of
abortion clinics by Operation Rescue. While the anti-Klan law was a protection
against organized hatred directed at blacks as a race, Justice Antonin Scalia's
majority opinion in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic rejected the
notion that efforts to impede aborton were equivalent to animosity against the
class of women.
Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be denied that there are common and
respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred or condescension toward (or
indeed any view at all concerning) women as a class.

In a season with little to cheer, abortion opponents were understandably
heartened by the Supreme Court's rejection of the anti-Klan law as a basis for
prosecuting Operation Rescue. The next day the New York Times quoted the
executive director of Operation Rescue, Keith Tucci, who recognized a moral
victory, a "message to our troops," in the Supreme Court decision. The Court's
action, in the mind of Tucci, invited a broader interpretation than simply the
refusal to read into a civil rights law a purpose far outside its original intent. It
could be construed as tacit consent to the aims of Operation Rescue. "What this
decision tells people is that it is perfectly legal to protest the killing of unborn
babies." A Court showing no likelihood now to overturn Roe v. Wade at least
would tolerate the most radical public stance against legalized abortion.
But perhaps concern for legal status or symbolic victory is a bit short-sighted.
The actual text of Justice Scalia's opinion cannot be said to include any
endorsement of Operation Rescue and simply invites the States to apply their
own laws against trespass of private property. The same New York Times article
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that quoted Keith Tucci concerned the possible increase in "attacks" on abortion
clinics as a result of the decision. A lawyer from the Center for Reproductive Law
and Policy spoke of the decision as "giving license to violence, almost chumming
for sharks," and she noted ominously "a national pattern of itinerant violence
against clinics." Other abortion-rights advocates sounded similar warnings of the
likely rise in violence against clinics and called for Congress to introduce
legislation making it a federal crime to block access to an abortion clinic.
It did not take long for Rep. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Rep. Constance
Morella (R-Md.) to oblige, and their bill now before Congress, which President
Clinton could conceivably sign, includes a first offense punishable by a year
in prison, with substantial fines, and a second offense punishable by fines
and three years imprisonment. Despite the recent Supreme Court decision,
Operation Rescue and its members have for some time been beaten up in the
courts nationwide. One prominent pro-life attorney John J. Broderick noted
recently that in trials of rescuersjurors vote for acquital "about once in a hundred
times." Even without a federal law to prosecute Operation Rescue, prison
sentences and stiff fines are customary now at the local level, and the number of
active rescuers has dwindled as a result. While the recent Supreme Court decison
evokes again the note of controversy that has generally surrounded Operation
Rescue, it is clear that Operation Rescue faces severe obstacles in the days ahead,
even more so since the killing on March 10th of Dr. David Gunn outside an
abortion clinic in Pensacola, Florida. Perhaps the moment is appropriate to
question it as a phenomenon of public record.
Unlike some previous efforts to effect political change through the practice of
civil disobedience, there has been an element of ambiguity in the public
perception of Operation Rescue, and probably because the traditional notions of
civil disobedience never quite applied in the case of Operation Rescue. From
Ghandi to Martin Luther King, the arousal of public sympathies through civil
disobedience has been historically connected to a protest against laws which
deprived liberties. But at this point in American legal history the right to abortion is
a liberty sustained on constitutional grounds. Precisely that condition makes
public protest against the abortion law a poor candidate for transmission of the
symbolic gesture required for the effectiveness of civil disobedience, which
traditionally evokes a condition of victim hood for the one whose rights and
liberties are transgressed.
If, in the United States, the legal status of abortion can be described as a right to
an action, a permission for a particular choice, it is not a law that reduces a liberty.
On the contrary, it exalts the freedom of individual choice to an absolute good
surpassing all others, even life itself. When an abortion clinic is blocked, those
whose rights are at risk, at least from a legal standpoint, are women who seek an
abortion. Any limitation ofthat right can be perceived as an attack on liberty, and
the one whose liberty is so violated becomes the victim. The legal right and the
defense of liberty join hands in this instance to repel aggression against a helpless
victim. Police brutalities become justified, court verdicts predictable, and the
media blatantly one-sided in coverage, because the focus of victimhood rests
finally on the woman denied her liberty. She provokes an image of vulnerability,
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isolated and utterly outnumbered by the crowds of Operation Rescue, attracting
counter-forces to her own rescue.
In their dissenting opinions to Bray v. Alexandria Women 's Health Clinic,
Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day O'Connor employed precisely the
notion of rising to the defense of violated rights in the face of a monolithic threat
to liberty. The language of sentiment is possible here because an image of
helplessness has attached itself to the woman seeking abortion, which evokes in
turn a need to denounce, even in exaggerated terms, the presence of grave
dangers. Even more than the appeal of aiding the "underdog," a woman in
distress calls forth the traditional stance of heroic and timely rescue. And so
Justice Stevens speaks of "nationwide conspiracy . .. zealous, politically
motivated, lawless conduct ... massive defiance of the law with violent
obstruction of the constitutional rights of their fellow citizens . . . the theft of their
constitutional rights by organized and violent mobs across the country." Justice
O'Connor's more sober statements nevertheless include references to women
desiring abortion as "victims of petitioners' tortious actions," confronting "force,
intimidation and violence" from those who "have chosen to target women
seeking abortions and to prevent them from exercising their equal rights under
the law."
Keith Tucci, in his New York Times statement, spoke of the Supreme Court
decision as a "message to our troops." Beyond the rhetorical flourish the
opportunity presented, the question may be asked whether Tucci was revealing
the self-understood purpose of Operation Rescue in a militant call to protest, and
so perhaps inviting the image these dissenting opinions assigned to Operation
Rescue. At the same time have there been deeper dimensions to this protest,
beyond the political realm, that justified it in ways not so well understood from
the purely legal standpoint? Has Operation Rescue sought primarily a political
objective - namely, the reversal of Roe v. Wade - which at present, since Casey
v. Planned Parenthood in the summer of 1992, might require at least a
nationwide conspiracy to overturn? Or is it possible that there were deeper
meanings at work in Operation Rescue that may have gone unnoticed? How
would Operation Rescue itself answer charges of violence, conspiracy and
victimization which intelligent minds identify with it?
Though the actual graphic drama of large-scale rescues and arrests in Atlanta
in 1989 and in Wichita, Kansas in 1991 attracted undeniable media interest, it
seems to be a superficial view that Operation Rescue was seeking as first aim to
gain public attention. Symbolic gesture trivializes the actual intention of an
Operation Rescue, which took place far more often on a local level beyond the
glare of national media focus. As a grass-roots movement the members of
Operation Rescue described it simply as an organized effort to block access to
abortion clinics on specific days with the aim of preventing the killing of any child
in that particular building that day. The goal was to prevent death from taking
place, even a single death if possible. Rather than dissipating the intensity of that
primary fact, there was an immediacy offocus precisely upon the near proximity
of potential killing. Such was its declared purpose - to save children's lives, no
more and no less - and its tactics followed suit. Whatever was necessary to close
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down a clinic for that day and so prevent the killing, chaining bodies to doors, for
instance, or overwhelming doors with bodies, was a defensible means of action
- anything short of violent action against another person. Blockading an
abortion clinic was not the time or place for diplomatic discussion of the
philosophical arguments.
Yet what else of significance was occurring as a result of such action, especially
when it took place locally and unknown to the clinic until the day of the
blockade? By obstructing access to a building, Operation Rescue obliterated, for
the moment, the constitutional right a mother possesses to destroy the child of her
womb. Any woman desiring an abortion who approached a blocked clinic
confronted an unforeseen event with repercussions beyond her immediate
consciousness. Her prior decision, as a mother, presumably deliberated upon in
earnest, was stonewalled. She did not lose the capacity to judge solely by herself
on the worth of the life in her womb, but the ability to carry out a judgment to kill
that life was forcibly paralyzed. Without her consultation, with no advance
notice, the death sentence she had already pronounced in the privacy of her
heart was overturned, and the reprieve not only rendered her judgment null and
ineffective, it subjected it at least temporarily to an interrogation now directed at
herself.
A successful Operation Rescue thus caused a rupture between the autonomy
of private judgment and the freedom of a right proclaimed by society. The
decisiveness of a judgment made in the privacy of conscience was denied access
to a right deemed legal in the public domain. Prevented by the blockade, a
mother's private intention could not translate itself into action, and this inability
to carry out her decision undermined a power she could assume she possessed
until then. Instead, the presumed correctness of a woman's choice, resting on a
right society had sanctioned, to decide for herself the fate of her child, was cast
back upon the mother emptied of its former claim to absolute independence. Her
autonomy, at least for the moment, became a cruel fiction.
No one would deny there was something quite aggressive in this action of
forcibly seizing a putative legal right from another and in effect declaring it no
right at all. Blockading a clinic tore from the legal right its normal vitality to issue
in action. But to affirm the right to life of a child, members of Operation Rescue
saw, in conscience, no alternative but to repudiate the legal right granted by a
legal decision. No compromise on the matter could be permitted. And perhaps
the action was expressing precisely the dilemma of a radical moral stance in the
postmodern world, since morality and legality claim, in this instance oflegalized
abortion, to uphold rights that are in direct conflict. Moral rights bound to life
itself and legal rights framed to meet current social pressures find no common
ground here.
Yet one might say these were merely legal aspects of the effort taken by
Operation Rescue to oppose abortion. To appreciate the deeper philosophical
undercurrent at work in Operation Rescue's protest, it may be necessary to grasp
a largely overlooked facet in the acceptance of abortion by American society in
the years since Roe v. Wade in 1973. Although the public debate over abortion is
ordinarily cast as a conflict of rights between a woman in her self-autonomy and
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the unborn child's right to life, an underlying foundation for the acceptance of
legalized abortion has been ignored, and it was perhaps Operation Rescue which
unwittingly made the point in dramatic fashion.
No abortion-related decision or opinion of a Justice since Roe v. Wade has
formally denied the reality of life in the fetus, only the right to life of the unborn
child. But the significance of a baby's existence to the self-understanding of a
pregnant woman has never been addressed in these years, except to reinforce the
notion of a child as an unwanted burden or a threat to a woman's sovereignty
over her own body. The unspoken implication necessary to justify abortion was
to leave aside the question whether the life to be terminated did not touch the
maternal instinct in a profound manner prior to birth, so much so that violation of
that instinct through directly intending the destruction of her own child might do
irreparable damage to the spiritual well-being of a mother.
This insidious attack on the true nature of the feminine maternal instinct
occurred through an assault on the natural union between a mother and her child.
Indeed a guiding principle for the Supreme Court Justices who have defended
Roe's continuance has been to underscore the ambiguous status of the unborn
child, withdrawing the child from a fundamental connection to the mother, and
thereby isolating the unborn as an entity of uncertain abstract meaning. The
ground was laid when Roe v. Wade, concerned for the private decision of the
mother, refused the "fetus" the constitutional protections associated with legal
personhood, since the fetus as person would implicate any direct assault upon its
life. Person, according to that decision, is a word that "has application only
postnatally." The decisive importance ofthat legal maneuver is telling for all that
follows.
If the notion of legal personhood determines who is a subject of rights, the
denial of personhood for the unborn child led soon enough to the conclusion that
any consideration of human life in the unborn child obscures the more pertinent
matter of the actual absence of legal rights for that life. Empirical fact, scientific
evidence, are permitted no direct input here. The only relevant fact is that there
can be no "significant" life where no legal right persists. Almost twenty years after
Roe, Justice Stevens was simply reiterating a firmly entrenched position of the
Court when his opinion to Casey v. Planned Parenthood (1992) noted the legal
consequence of the unborn child lacking the status of personhood:
A developing organism that is not yet a 'person' does not have what is sometimes
described as a 'right to life.'

A process of abstraction was thus begun with Roe v. Wade that proved a
methodology for the defense of abortion rights. Dissolving the unborn child into
a mere idea with a rival claim to a right that encroached on a woman's private
choice encouraged further confusions beyond the cut-and-dried world of legal
decisions. The isolation of the unborn child as an abstraction relative to the
mother's private autonomy was the preparation for muddling the scientific and
philosophical orders. Recognition of the existence of human life in the unborn, a
scientific question, became tied in the views of some Justices to the metaphysical
problem of personhood residing in human life prior to birth, indeed, from the
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moment of conception.
And so by Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (1986), in the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, the
presumption that an unborn child could be a human being had itself become a
religious question, a notion to be placed alongside the consideration whether the
fetus was a person. The Court had already rejected legal personhood for the fetus,
now it could feel free, according to Stevens, to extend a flat-out denial to the
existence of human life in the fetus, a question apparently no longer outside the
Court's competence, since it was clear by now, at least to Stevens, that the
absence oflegal personhood, begun with Roe, deprived the unborn child equally
of scientific and philosophical status as well.
For, unless the religious view that a fetus is a 'person' is adopted . . . there is a fundamental
and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being; indeed, if there is not
such a difference, the permissibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left
to the will of the state legislatures.

The necessity in the view of Justice Stevens to expel from the Court any hint of
metaphysical regard in its deliberations, while actually in effect pronouncing
answers of philosophical import, led finally in Casey v. Planned Parenthood
(1992) to the unseemly exaltation of self-autonomy as an abstraction upon which
the Court could at last stake a metaphysical commitment. Liberty now was
equated with an autonomous right of definition, not simply about private
decisions "basic to individual dignity and autonomy," not simply concerning a
"certain private sphere of individual liberty," as Thornburgh had said, but
concerning the nature of the basic truths of human life.
At the heart ofliberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life.

•
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Truth thus depends solely on its being determined as such by whoever chooses to
do so, and most especially, one would expect, when the matter concerns "the
right," as Justice Blackmun had already written in dissenting from Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services Inc. in 1989, "to make the uniquely personal,
intimate and self-defining decision whether to end a pregnancy."
How did Operation Rescue speak directly to the underlying philosophical bias
expressed in the Supreme Court's progressive reduction of the meaning of an
unborn child? If the individual's right of self-definition has become, according to
Casey, the cornerstone of the defense of abortion rights, how did Operation
Rescue cast light on the significance of a pregnant mother defining herself apart
from the presence of the baby in her womb? The answers perhaps lie in the effect
of a "rescue" upon the maternal instinct of a woman.
When members of Operation Rescue were arrested, it was generally for
placing their own bodies in between that of the mother and a clinic, protecting a
child from its potential murder inside that building. Far from being passive, this
aggressive action announced in forthright terms that the inconvenience of a
pregnancy could not be expediently done away with. But there was more than a
denial of the legal right in this action, or of the more ethereal philosophicai
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capacity for self-definition. Blocking access to an abortion clinic affirmed a
woman's motherhood, and the real existence of the child she carried, in a manner
that no moral debate could match. How so?
While the principal strategy of an Operation Rescue has been this use of a
blockade, what that blockade never did was separate a child from his or her
mother. On the contrary, any mother impeded from entering a clinic was forced,
willingly or not, to gaze back self-reflexively upon her own motherhood and the
inner conflict created in her heart by legalized abortion. It is true that on the level
of argument her own child's right to continuing existence remained at odds with
the legal right she possessed, as a mother, to abort that child. But this conflict was
more than one of abstract legal rights. Two opposing experiences of subjectivity
were at war in the heart of a mother contemplating an abortion, and her attempt
to gain entrance to the abortion clinic blocked by Operation Rescue bared this
self-contradiction.
What was truly exposed here was the awful capacity of the human heart to
retain diametrically opposed interior states. A mother, because she is a mother,
cannot help but carry within her the instinct of a mother's nature to preserve her
baby from harm. And yet simultaneously she can surrender to the desire for
self-autonomy which an abortion will, for the moment, guarantee. The sanction
of law offers a possibility that contradicts the natural instinct, and indeed it
encourages just such a step. But the law cannot overcome an instinct rooted in
nature any more than a mother can eradicate the law of nature through an act of
violence against herself. By appealing to the subjective desire for self-autonomy,
the seductive presence oflegal right may temporarily blur and confuse the natural
instinct, block it even, but it cannot banish entirely a mother's protective instinct
toward her own infant. And it is precisely such depths of feeling for the reality of
her own child's existence which Operation Rescue forced upon a mother.
When the blockade of a clinic by Operation Rescue restored the right to live, at
least for the moment, of the child whose life hung precariously in the balance,
more than a test of conflicting freedoms thus weighed in the balance. A
metaphysical victory was taking place. There was an implicit statement in a
successful blockade that the transcendent value of life does not submit to the
immanence of autonomous self-will. That a child, simply because it is a child,
should remain alive, triumphed over the notion that arbitrary willfulness should
have power over life. Every legalistic ingenuity to transform a baby into a mere
abstraction of public controversy over the rights of self-autonomy became
exposed as a lie preparing the ground for a naked evil. Unwilling to submit to
society's dispatch of the unborn child as a mere disposable item on the agenda of
autonomous rights, Operation Rescue insisted on a metaphysical vindication of
the personhood of the baby in the womb, and so restored to a mother the chance
to embrace again the beauty and the dignity of her own motherhood.
Before Casey v. Planned Parenthood in 1992, the majority opinions of the
Supreme Court were inclined to subsume questions of personhood and the
existence of human life under a category of the unanswerable. The newfound
realization in the 1992 ruling is that private liberty and its self-defining capacity
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provide the elixir for all such questions. Shedding its customary reluctance for
broaching metaphysical matters, the Court in the summer of 1992 waxed
eloquent in encouraging what amounts to the individual's private presumption of
reaching moral certitude simply because decision-making is inherently selfjustifying. Instead of demanding hard reasoned judgment, the Casey decision
implies that moral praxis means to be guided by predilections arising out of the
individual's own desires, requiring only the ability to convince oneself of an
outstanding personal need of the moment.
Casey's notion of liberty is thus a barely disguised brand of the modern faith
acceptable to a world without reference to God. For liberty of this sort proposes a
belief in the self as isolated in its own infallible will to self-definition. The
pretension of attaining a metaphysical high ground in this rooting of liberty in a
principle of moral self-autonomy should not be missed. Perhaps without so
intending, Justice Scalia's criticism of the judicial methodology of the majority
decision in Casey is equally a blunt statement on the consequences to personal
morality when self-autonomy is the one defensible absolute.
It is not reasoned judgment that supports the court's decision; only personal predilection
. . . what the court calls 'reasoned judgment' . .. turns out to be nothing but
philosophical predilection and moral intuition.

•

In a statement of unintended self-disclosure on the spiritual state of a nation,
this same Casey decision ominously asserts that "an entire generation has come of
age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty." Perhaps in the wake of the Court's
endorsement of such dubious notions of liberty, Operation Rescue can be seen
now as all along offering something of a test case for the loss of critical
intelligibility in contemporary moral understanding. Perhaps not fully aware
even of its own implications, Operation Rescue laid bare the fragile survival of
truth in an arena of conflict where antiseptic abstractions have too long directed
the course of arguments. The result has been a gradual numbing of the moral
conscience of the nation, which should be no surprise. An anesthetized
conscience is a likely consequence when the choice of evil is made easier by
rationalized motives.
The Supreme Court's defense of abortion rights is partially to blame in this
regard. By adopting over the years an unnatural logic that splits mother and child
into abstract entities having no basis in flesh and blood, the Court has desensitized
the American conscience about the reality of abortion. With the reaffirmation by
Casey of the constitutional right to abortion, a woman's sense of personal
freedom can declare even more firmly her triumph over disposable tissue. But
such a victory involves far more than indulging oneself in a grandiose notion of
liberty. A betrayal of reality is also necessary, for a baby in the womb is not a
concept, a mere thought, and a mother's lie to herself undergirds the refusal to
protect the life of her unborn child.
Operation Rescue's aggressive methods were a metaphysical protest against
that lie, a rebellion directed at the reign of abstractions which violate the actual
truths of motherhood. Civil disobedience is thus an incomplete description for
the illegal actions of Operation Rescue. What was really taking place was a
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"metaphysical disobedience" against a philosophy of autonomous liberty now
enshrined in a Supreme Court ruling. The doors of an abortion clinic were the
portals of death in more ways than one, and there was no choice but to close
them.
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